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the degree of regulatory transparency by issuing more or less revealing
guidelines describing the operation of the rule of law in various circumstances.
In this setting, the appeals authority maximizes its ability to extract rents from
investors by issuing weakly differentiated guidelines which yield the highest
possible rate of interdiction by the enforcement authority, together with the
highest possible likelihood that interdiction will be overturned on appeal.
Keywords: Regulatory Transparency, Regulatory Efficiency, Corruption.
JEL Codes: D73, K40, K42.
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027
USA
CEEERC





t Please send correspondence to the author at the CEEERC address given above. This
paper was presented at the Econometric Society European Meetings, Toulouse, 1997. An
earlier version, titled "Regulatory Ambiguity and Corruption,'" was presented at the Johns
Hopkins University and the University of Michigan.
Optimal Regulatory Transparency
Leonard F. Herk
"It is generally necessary to use more rigor in making inquisition, so that when
the crime has been brought to light, there may be scope for displaying clemency."
St. Augustine of Hippo (quoted in Johnson, 1976).
1. Introduction
Scholarly analysis of regulatory practice often takes for granted that the application of
an underlying system of rules is sufficiently clear that both regulators and regulated can
distinguish between permitted and proscribed behaviors.l In practice, this is not always so.
More typically, formal rules or statues are sufficiently open-ended that their lawful
application in specific circumstances may be more or less predictable. In this context, there
arises a natural concern with regulatory transparency, meaning the predictability of regulatory
practice from the point of view of the regulated. Lack of regulatory transparency is
commonly cited as a serious impediment to investment and economic development in
"emerging" market economies, for example in Asia and Eastern Europe, where apparent
deviations between rules and practice are often striking. But similar concerns apply also to
western economies, where manifestations of regulatory ambiguity are less extreme and
perhaps better accepted by virtue of long tenure.
In this paper, I consider the optimal degree of regulatory transparency from the
perspective of a self-interested regulator. By so doing, I seek to address an important but
hitherto largely overlooked question in the study of law and economics: Taking a system of
rules as given, to what extent does a self-interested regulator communicate the logic of their
operation accurately to subordinate parties who are affected by them?
My analysis is based on a model which characterizes public regulation of private
1
 The assumption that proscribed actions are observable is implicit in the literature
on optimal penalties and monitoring, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1992),
Kaplow and Shavell (1994). Mookherjee and Png (1994). In Andreoni's (1991) analysis of
standards of proof, the law is clear in that the accused knows if he or she has committed a
crime, only the jury's verdict reflects exogenous uncertainty about the facts of the case.
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enterprise as the administration of an abstract rule of law delineating permitted and proscribed
actions. Regulatory oversight is accomplished by a institutional hierarchy composed of two
semi-independent branches. The first branch, which I call the enforcement authority,
exercises primary police power to monitor private undertakings. Any private investment
project, once undertaken, may be interdicted (canceled) by the enforcement authority before
its final payoff is realized. Interdiction results when, in the judgment of the enforcement
authority, circumstances have occurred which violate the rule of law. A second and higher
branch, which I call the appeals authority, reviews interdictions at the instance of the
aggrieved investor, upholding those which it finds to be valid under the rule of law and
voiding those which are not. All investments which are not interdicted (including those
whose initial interdictions are overruled by the appeals authority) proceed to completion.
According to this separation of functions, interdictions are brought on the initiative
and judgment of the enforcement authority, but the appeals authority retains ultimate power to
interpret the prevailing rule of law in relation to specific factual circumstances. The appeals
authority plays the role of lawgiver, the highest authority for resolving disputes concerning
the proper application of an underlying rule of law. In essence, this means that the rule of law
constitutes private knowledge to the appeals authority, whose power to interpret the rule of
law in specific cases is effectively the power to define it.
It bears emphasis that the idea of regulatory transparency in this paper relates to
practice, as opposed to the "black letter" content of formal rules or statutes which the appeals
authority is charged to interpret. Typically, enabling rules or statutes are sufficiently broad
that their application in specific circumstances requires further construction, as for example,
when the statutory basis for voiding a completed public tender requires a judgment
concerning "open and competitive bidding", "significant environmental risk", or "compelling
public interest". Lack of regulatory transparency does not necessarily imply overtly
randomized behavior on the part of the appeals authority; it can result instead from highly
differentiated rules of construction whose operation is difficult for nonspecialists or
"outsiders" to predict.
Decisions of private investors and the enforcement authority to undertake, interdict,
and appeal an investment project will be influenced by their perception of how the appeals
authority is likely to interpret the rule of law. The rule of law is more transparent as decisions
of the appeals authority are more predictable to investors and the enforcement authority;
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conversely, it is more ambiguous as these decisions are less predictable. My model allows
that the appeals authority may reveal the logic of its own decision-making process to both
affected parties by issuing guidelines. Consequently, the appeals authority itself controls the
degree of regulatory transparency by promulgating guidelines which are either informative
and precise, or uninformative and vague.
I assume that the appeals authority seeks to maximize the earning potential of the
entire sector of services which its operations support, measured as investors' total willingness
to pay for services related to undertaking an appeal. In this understanding, the magnitude of
"fees" paid by investors to the appeals authority comprehends not only filing fees, which are
often negligible, but also payments for the services of consultants, lawyers, and lobbyists.
The criterion of administrative efficiency suggests that the appeals authority should
communicate the logic of its decision-making process via clear and informative guidelines;3
however, this ideal runs contrary to the appeals authority's interest in generating rents. If the
operation of the rule of law is entirely clear to both investors and the enforcement authority,
then disagreements leading to appeals do not occur. A rent-seeking appeals authority prefers
to issue guidelines which are sufficiently ambiguous to maximize its own custom, meaning
the net value of cases referred for review, and thus its ability to extract rents from investors.
My main result shows that a self-interested appeals authority issues guidelines which
are simple and relatively undifferentiated. Optimal regulatory guidelines delineate limited
regions of clearly permitted and clearly proscribed conduct, but are uninformative over the
broadest possible range of remaining circumstances. Interestingly, the informational
" The interests of the appeals authority may be consonant with the general prosperity
of appeals-related services for several well-known reasons. First, this sector can provide
employment for former (or present) functionaries of the appeals authority via a "revolving
door" policy. Second, advocacy from practitioners in this sector is likely to shape decisions
of the appeals authority in ways sympathetic to their own interests. Finally, budgetary
allocations and political influence to the appeals authority are more likely to increase as its
caseload increases, which also implies greater custom for related service providers.
' My concern is with the efficient administration of given rules, as distinct from the
design of substantive rules which promote economically efficient conduct.
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landscape induced by optimal guidelines is independent of the distribution of possible
investment projects and investor risk preferences.
Optimal regulatory guidelines configure the informational landscape to investors and
the enforcement authority in such a way that the appeals authority realizes simultaneously the
highest possible rate of interdiction by the enforcement authority together with the highest
possible likelihood that interdictions will be overturned on appeal. The conjunction of a high
rate of interdiction with a high expectation of successful appeal maximizes custom to the
appeals authority, both in volume of appeals and in the value of potential rents from
individual appeals. This characterization of optimal guidelines, and thus of optimal
regulatory transparency, constitutes a formal validation of St. Augustine's thesis that the most
satisfactory state of affairs for a regulatory authority is one in which the regulated are
frequently threatened with sanctions, which nonetheless are liberally overturned on appeal.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 formulates the problem of optimal regulatory landscaping, and then presents and
discusses my results. In Section 4,1 offer some examples from emerging market economies
which are consistent with my theory, and comment on the relation of my work to the existing
economic literature on corruption. Proofs of propositions are contained in an appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. Overview
Private investment activity is policed by a regulatory authority composed of two semi-
independent branches: an enforcement authority and an appeals authority. Any private
investment, once undertaken, may be interdicted and canceled by the enforcement authority
4
 St. Augustine's philosophy, articulated in the 4th century, finds echoes in recent
history. Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie held daily audiences to decree punishment or
absolution for persons brought before him by ubiquitous security forces. The price of
absolution was loyalty to the regime, to be demonstrated, for example, by informing on
others. A former functionary observed, "Seeking to gain the master's favor, [the security
forces] feverishly tried to impose absolute order. However, what [Haile Selassie] really
wanted was fundamental order - meaning order, but with a certain margin of disorder on
which he could manifest his kindness and indulgence." (Kapuscinski, 1978).
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before its final payoff is realized. An investment project which is not interdicted proceeds to
completion and realizes its final payoff.
In the event that an investment is interdicted, the investor has the right to request a
review by the appeals authority. The appeals authority reviews the circumstances of each
investment project and determines whether interdiction by the enforcement authority is valid
or invalid. In the former case, the interdiction is upheld; in the latter case, the interdiction is
voided and the investment is allowed to proceed to completion. If an investment project is
effectively canceled, either because the investor chooses not to appeal an interdiction or
because the interdiction is upheld on appeal, then the investor forfeits the investment's sunk
cost without realizing any further payoff. In addition, an investor who appeals an interdiction
pays a fee to the appeals authority which is independent of the appeal's outcome.
2.2. Investors
A finite population of investors is differentiated both according to individual risk
preferences and the characteristics of the specific project which each investor can undertake.
A type-/ investor has risk preferences conforming to the expected utility functional
Ut(z) = E[ut(z)] defined over bounded monetary risks z , where ut is a strictly increasing
and twice differentiable utility index. For every investor, I assume that the utility functional
V
 t exhibits decreasing marginal utility of wealth.
DEFINITION (DECREASING MARGINAL UTILITY OF WEALTH). For bounded monetary risks x
and y, E[u,{y))7> E[u,(x)] implies £[<(>)]< E[u',(x)].
An expected utility functional U, which exhibits decreasing marginal utility of wealth is
(weakly) averse to mean-preserving increases in risk, as may be seen by choosing x and y to
be scalars in the definition above. More generally, a utility functional V
 t(z) = E[ut(z)] with
this property is concave with respect to incremental wealth added to any initial portfolio z ,
and not merely to initial portfolios for which z is a scalar. It turns out that the property of
decreasing marginal utility of wealth identifies exactly the class of expected utility functional
for which the Arrow-Pratt index of local risk aversion p, = -u"{z)/ ut{z) is nonnegative and
constant over all wealth levels z.
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PROPOSITION 1. The expected utility function Ut(z) = E[ut(z)] exhibits universally
decreasing marginal utility of wealth if and only if pt = -u't\z) / u'(z)>0 is constant.
In the remainder of the paper, I will use the specifications ut{z) = z for risk neutral
preferences (p, = 0), and u((z) =(\-exp(-plz)) with p, > 0 for preferences which are
strictly risk averse. These specifications impose the normalization w,(0) = 0 .
A type-/ investor may elect to undertake an investment project with commitment stake
st and net realization value (v, - st). The commitment stake is expended immediately when
the investment is undertaken, and constitutes a sunk cost thereafter. The realization value
represents a payoff which the investor receives with certainty if the project proceeds to
completion. If the investor decides not to undertake the project, then the resulting net payoff
is zero. In the event that the investment is undertaken and subsequently interdicted by the
enforcement authority, then the investor must decide whether to accept this decision as
binding or refer it to the appeals authority for review.
In summary, a type-/ investor is identified by characteristics {s,,vltut), where u{ is
an expected utility index exhibiting universally decreasing marginal utility of wealth. An
investor's course of action consists of an initial decision to undertake or reject the investment,
together with subsequent contingent decisions to appeal or accept an eventual interdiction in
light of attendant circumstances. Each investor chooses a course of action which maximizes
expected utility, as will be described more fully in the analysis of optimal regulatory
transparency in Section 3.
The assumption that investor risk preferences exhibit decreasing marginal utility of
wealth will be seen to permit a concise and intuitive characterization of optimal regulatory
transparency, one which also allows for easy implementation. Optimal regulatory design
without this assumption, even for a single investor type, becomes much more sensitive to
specific information about risk preferences, project realization value, and the associated
commitment stake, and hence is more doubtful of realization in practice.5 It is also worth
noting that the implied assumption of constant absolute risk aversion among individual
5
 In the appendix, I explain how the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of
wealth effects optimal regulatory transparency, and indicate complications which arise when
this assumption is relaxed.
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investors may be a good approximation to reality. In an empirical study of risk preference
among racetrack bettors, Jullien and Salanie (1997) find that constant absolute risk aversion
gives the best fit among a broader parametric class of expected utility functional.
2.3. The Appeals Authority
The appeals authority oversees the execution by the enforcement authority of a system
of rules which determines whether an investment project is proceeding agreeably with social
norms. The enforcement authority may choose to interdict any investment project according
to its own judgment; however, the appeals authority retains the power to review interdictions
by the enforcement authority on appeal by the affected investor. The decision of the appeals
authority is final and binding on all parties.
The validity of interdicting a particular investment project can depend on
circumstances which have occurred after the time the investment is committed, but before its
final payoff is realized. Circumstances which validate interdiction of an already undertaken
investment project may include improper conduct by the investor, or the appearance of new
evidence indicating that social disutility or external costs associated with the project are
greater than was originally supposed at the time it was begun.6 Applicable standards for
evaluating attendant circumstances can depend on the nature of the investment itself. For
example, stricter standards may be applied to projects which affect "sensitive" economic
sectors or involve substantial ownership claims by foreign capital.
Formally, the regulatory status of any investment in progress is summarized by
(t.co ), where t is the investor's type and co represents material facts relevant to the validity
of interdiction. Hereafter, I will refer to an investment project as the constellation (t, co) of
6
 As an example of the latter situation, an agreement to privatize a state-owned
enterprise my be voided at the instance of government, even after the new purchaser has
undertaken nonrecoverable capital outlays, if a third party tenders a better offer. In such
situations, the original purchaser's ability to protect its ownership claim may depend on an
appellate decision concerning whether the original agreement was "preliminary" or "final".
investor type together with material facts affecting the investment's regulatory status.7
The universe of investors t eT and material facts co e Q generates a probability
space (TxQ, 2T x3, P), for which 2T x3 is a set of joint events on the sample space TxQ,
and P is a probability measure defined over 2 r x 3 . 8 I assume that the probability measure
P is atomiess with respect to material facts, that is: P(co) = 0 for all co e Q. This assures
that the appeals authority has the ability to make arbitrarily fine distinctions between different
collections of material facts.
The appeals authority determines the validity of interdicting an investment project
(t,co) by applying a deterministic rule of law y/v Q -> {0,1}, for which
f 0 if interdiction is invalid.
w(co) = \
{ 1 if interdiction is valid.
I will assume that the rule of law if/ is objective in the sense that it depends only on
circumstances which are publically verifiable, not on the private information of any party.
Consequently, if the rule of law were known to the enforcement authority or the investor, then
either side would be able to determine exactly the validity of interdiction \f/(co) for all
circumstances co e Q. This assumption is formally stated below.
ASSUMPTION (OBJECTIVITY). Q consists of circumstances which are observable to all
parties: the appeals authority, the enforcement authority, and the affected investor.
In the following analysis, an exogenous rule of law y/ constitutes private information
to the appeals authority. The appeals authority may reveal the rule of law, either partially or
fully, to investors and the enforcement authority by issuing guidelines. In the sense of my
analysis, guidelines may refer to formal written handbooks like those issued by the Antitrust
Material facts are a collection of indicators which fully summarize the character
and history of a given case. This formulation allows the possibility that material facts may be
correlated with, or even include, the investor's type.
8
 2T designates the set of all subsets of T, hence the set of all subcollections of
investor types. Recall that the number of distinct investor types is finite by assumption.
9
 In effect, the assumption that P is atomiess means the appeals authority can "split
hairs" to whatever degree it desires when interpreting the facts of each case.
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Division of the United States Department of Justice concerning horizontal mergers and
international operations of private firms; in other contexts, guidelines may refer more loosely
to the corpus of outstanding appellate decisions and holdings which constitute legible
"footprints" of the rule of law as implemented by the appeals authority.
Formally, regulatory guidelines are represented by a function y/: Q -> [0,1 ] which
satisfies E[y/ y> = q] - q for all q e [0,1 ] . 1 0 Guidelines satisfying this condition will be
called consistent. n In brief, regulatory guidelines \j/ induce a partition on the sample space
Q which conveys information about the expected validity of interdiction in light of
prevailing material facts. Thus, y/(co) is the probability that interdiction by the enforcement
authority is valid under circumstances co e Q, and hence will be upheld on appeal. At one
extreme, guidelines of the form y/(co) = y{co) are completely revealing; at the other extreme,
guidelines of the form \j/(co) = E[\{/] are completely uninformative.
In general, guidelines may create a "safe harbor" {co e Q: y/(co) = 0}, meaning a
region of circumstances in which interdiction is certainly unjustified; as well as a region of
circumstances {co e Q: yico) = 1} in which interdiction is certainly valid. In both of these
two regions, the guidelines completely reveal the rule of law. In all remaining circumstances
co for which 0 < y/(w) < 1, the guidelines reveal the rule of law only partially.
The relation between guidelines and the underlying rule of law is illustrated in Figure
1, where material facts Q are identified with the unit interval on which P{{a,b])-b-a .
The guidelines in Figure 1 divide material facts into three categories: a "safe harbor", a region
in which interdiction is certainly valid, and a region of "intermediate" circumstances in which
it is only possible to infer that interdiction by the enforcement authority will be upheld on
appeal one time in three.
10
 It would be enough to require that equality holds for "almost all" values of
q £ [ 0.1 ] . Hereafter, I will ignore fine distinctions between "all" and "almost all".
11
 The consistency requirement is actually just a normalization. Any signal E,{co)
which conveys information about the validity of interdiction under circumstances co can be
transformed into consistent guidelines by renaming \fr(co) = £"[y/| £ =
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FIGURE 1
THE RULE OF LAW AND REGULATORY GUIDELINES
if/ : 0
H 1
0) : 0 .45 .75 .9 1
V • 0 1/3 1
The appeals authority is free to issue any guidelines y> which are consistent with i//.
In addition, the appeals authority designates a contingent fee structure q>: [0,1 ] -» SH+ which
has the following interpretation: in order to appeal an interdiction under circumstances co for
which the expected validity is \j/(oo) = q, the investor must pay the appeals authority the
amount (p(q). This payment is independent of the outcome of the appeal.
In sum, for a given rule of law i//, the appeals authority determines a regulatory
regime (\f/,q>) consisting of consistent guidelines and an associated contingent fee schedule.
2.4. The Enforcement Authority
The enforcement authority reviews investment projects which are actually undertaken,
and interdicts some or all of them in light of attendant material facts.
The marginal payoff to the enforcement authority from interdicting a particular
investment project (t,co) depends on the expected validity rate of interdiction y((o)
according to fi(\j/(co)), where \i is a continuous and strictly increasing merit function which
maps the unit interval [0,1 ] onto[- 1,1 ] . 1 2 The total payoff to the enforcement authority
from interdicting a subset of investment projects / e 2 r x 3 is therefore J jj{\pr(co))dP(t,co).
Under this specification, there exists a threshold validity rate q e (0,1) defined by
/d{q) = 0 such that the marginal payoff to the enforcement authority from interdicting an
investment project (t,o)) is weakly positive if and only if
The range of the merit index fj. can be defined to be any closed interval having




The threshold q identifies the minimum expected validity rate of interdiction at which the
enforcement authority is willing to intervene in private investment projects. This magnitude,
which may be taken to represent the limit of social tolerance for regulatory interference, will
be treated as exogenous. The enforcement authority interdicts all investment projects (t,co)
which satisfy the threshold validity condition (1).
The interdiction rule based on a threshold validity rate q embeds two implicit
assumptions. First, it implies a structural consonance of interest between the enforcement
authority and the appeals authority to the degree that the decision of the former to interdict a
specific investment project is based exclusively on the a priori expected validity of
interdiction according to guidelines issued by the latter. This means, for example, that the
enforcement authority does not pursue its own private agenda to harass or oblige certain
investors independently of meritorious grounds for interdiction. Likewise, the enforcement
authority is not directly concerned with its own costs or track record on appeal: it will not
interdict an investment on doubtful meritorious grounds if it perceives that the investor is
unlikely to appeal, nor will it refrain from interdicting an investment on more solid grounds if
the investor is very likely to appeal.
Second, this form of threshold decision rule implies that the enforcement authority
faces no effective constraint on its aggregate activity level: it has adequate physical resources
to interdict all investment projects which surpass the validity threshold q. Otherwise, the
value of the threshold validity level for interdiction would depend not only on considerations
of merit, but also on an overall activity constraint reflecting budgetary tightness.
The following assumptions are intended to ensure that a regulatory regime (y/, <p)
based on the rule of law y conforms to basic notions of fairness. Together with the
objectivity and uniform class assumptions, they will be maintained throughout the paper.
ASSUMPTION (FULL DISCOVERY). The guidelines y> are known to both the enforcement
authority and investors.
ASSUMPTION (DE MINIMIS). I 3 If y> = g results in a zero rate of interdiction (whence q<q),
then q = 0 . (Equivalently, the guidelines y> have no support on the open interval (0,q)) .
Both of these assumptions have straightforward interpretations. The full discovery
assumption ensures that neither the enforcement authority nor the investor has private
information concerning the operation of the rule of law. Full discovery together with
objectivity implies the decision of the enforcement authority to interdict and of the investor to
appeal an interdiction will be based on identical information. The de minimis condition
requires that regulatory guidelines be consistent with enforcement practice to the extent that
factual circumstances in which interdiction never occurs are called "blameless" in the
guidelines. De minimis may be understood as a naming convention: Regulatory guidelines
must acknowledge as belonging to the "safe harbor" all circumstances for which the resulting
frequency of interdiction is zero.
3. Optimal Regulatory Landscaping
3.1. Basic Structure
In the following analysis, it will be sufficient to consider finite regulatory guidelines,
that is: guidelines for which the associated distribution of interdiction validity rates has finite
support.14 Hereafter, I will refer to the distribution of interdiction validity rates F^ associated
with the guidelines «// as the regulatory landscape induced by y>.
For given guidelines y>, the induced regulatory landscape has the form
Fv = PoSQ + P\$qx + ••• + Pn&qm » ^ (2)
13
 This terminology derives from the motto, "De minimis non curat lex" (The law
does not care about trifles).
14
 This simplification stems from the observations that any distribution of interdiction
validity rates resulting from continuous regulatory guidelines can be approximated arbitrarily
well by finite guidelines, and that the optimized contingent fee structure to the appeals
authority depends continuously on this distribution.
15
 Sx: T\ -> 9\ is defined by 8x(z) = 0 for z < x and Sx(z) = 1 for z > x .
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FIGURE 2
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with 0 < pQ pn < 1, p0 +... + pn = 1, and qj >q for i = 1,..., n in keeping with the de
minimis condition. The regulatory landscape (2) allows a "safe harbor" with probability p0;
while in each of the remaining contingencies with probabilities pl, i=\,...,n, interdiction
occurs for which the validity rate is perceived as qt by both the investor and the enforcement
authority. Corresponding to this regulatory landscape, the appeals authority names a
contingent fee schedule {q>{qt): i = 1,..., n}.
3.2. Derivation of the Optimal Regulatory Landscape
For a regulatory regime (y/,cp) as described above, the type-/ investor with
characteristics (s t , v,, ut) faces the decision tree shown in Figure 2. Taking the regulatory
landscape F^ from (2) as given and supposing that all investors are of type-f, the appeals
authority chooses optimal contingent fees {(p,(q,): i = 1 n} to solve
max (3)
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subject to the constraints
{/,($,.,?,.) >«,(-*,) for i = l f . . . ,n, (4)
and
p o W > , - 0 + X;=I/?,a,(tf,,<p,)>0, (5)
where
Ut(ql,(pi) = (\-ql)ul(vl-s! -<?,) + qx ul(-sl -<p,)
is the type-? investor's contingent utility from appealing an interdiction with validity rate qi
and appeal fee cpt.
The n constraints in (4) dictate that the investor's willingness to pay for an appeal in
any contingency is limited by the disutility of forfeiting the initial outlay. The remaining
constraint (5) requires that the contingent fee schedule be compatible with the investor's
overall willingness to undertake the investment.
To characterize the optimal fee schedule {<p, {qt): i = 1,..., n} for the maximization
problem (3)-(5), it is useful to note that the regulatory landscape (2) can be represented as
According to this representation, the regulatory landscape F^ is seen to confront the
investor with a compound lottery consisting of n distinct sub-landscapes as described by the
bracketed term in (6). Each regulatory sub-landscape of the form
offers a "safe harbor" frequency of p0, together with uniform validity rate of interdiction qt
outside the "safe harbor".
While Figure 3 is based on the representation (6), and thus depicts the same regulatory
landscape F^ as in Figure 2, the decision problems in both figures are different. For the true
specification depicted in Figure 2, the type-r investor decides whether to undertake the
investment before the contingent validity rate in the event of interdiction is revealed. For the
alternate specification depicted in Figure 3, the investor's decision to undertake the
investment is deferred until after this contingent validity rate has been revealed.
Consequently, the two specifications need not yield the same optimal contingent fee
schedules. However, it can be shown that the optimal contingent fee schedules are indeed
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FIGURE 3












identical for both specifications if the type-r investor's risk preferences exhibit universally
decreasing marginal utility of wealth.
For the given regulatory landscape F^ and investor type t, it is easy to characterize the
optimal contingent fee schedule {<p, (qt): i = 1 n} for the alternate specification. Here, the
investor's decision to invest is contingent on revelation of the prevailing sub-landscape of the
form (7), and therefore takes into account the indicated validity rate qi in the event of
interdiction. In this setting, the optimal contingent appeal fee in every sub-landscape is
simply the maximal fee which preserves the investor's willingness to undertake the
investment and to appeal an eventual interdiction. Thus, (pt(q,) equals
(8)<p: £/,(<?,,<?) > K , ( - J , ) and p0M,(v, - s,) + ( l - po)U,(qit<p) > 0 } .
It is easy to see that {<p, (qt): i = 1,..., n} satisfies constraints (4) and (5)
corresponding to the true specification in Figure 2. Indeed, constraint (5) for the true
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specification requires merely that the investor's expected utility over all contingent sub-
landscapes be nonnegative, whereas the alternate specification in Figure 3 honors this
condition in every regulatory sub-landscape.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that a type-/ investor has characteristics (s,, v,, ut), where ut is a
utility index exhibiting universally decreasing marginal utility of wealth. For given regulatory
guidelines y/ conforming to (2), optimal contingent fees {cpt (qi): i = 1,..., n} under the
specification (3)-(5) are identical to optimal contingent fees for regulatory sub-landscapes of
the form po8Q + (1 - p0)Sq.. Thus, <pt(qt) = <p,{q,) for / = 1,...,n.
According to Proposition 2, the optimal contingent fee schedule {<pt(qt): i = {,...,n} for an
arbitrary regulatory landscape F^ = po8Q + p]8qi + . . . + Pn8qn and investor type / is obtained
by evaluating (8) over {qi,...,qn}, which is the support of the regulatory landscape outside
the "safe harbor". Consequently, for a given "safe harbor" frequency p0, the optimal
regulatory landscape F^>0 outside the "safe harbor" maximizes
^{q) (9)
subject to the aggregate consistency constraint
£ [ i ^ | v>>O]=£[v / ] / ( l -p o ) . (10)
The formulation (9)—(10) implies that the character of the optimal regulatory landscape F^>0
will depend on the properties of the optimal fee function (p,(q) for regulatory sub-landscapes
of the form po8Q + (1 - po)8q. These properties are outlined in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that a type-/ investor has characteristics (s t , v,, ut), where ut is a
utility index exhibiting universally decreasing marginal utility of wealth. For an arbitrary
"safe harbor" frequency pQ, let cpt (q) be the optimal contingent fee schedule to this investor
for regulatory sub-landscapes of the form pQ8Q + (1 - po)8q. Then, (p((q) is convex on
[0,1 ] , strictly decreasing whenever it is greater than zero, and satisfies <p,(l) = 0.
Because the contingent fee function <pt is convex, the problem of choosing a
regulatory landscape F^>0 to maximize (9) subject to the consistency constraint (10)
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conforms to a canonical structure. It is well known that the expectation of any convex
function is maximized over the set of all distributions having a common mean by choosing
the distribution with the greatest possible dispersion.16 Consequently, for a given "safe
harbor" frequency p0 and investor type t, the optimal regulatory landscape F ^ > 0 outside the
"safe harbor" has binary support at the endpoints of the interval [q, 1 ] of validity rates which
provoke interdiction by the enforcement authority. Thus,
where 5^  is determined from the consistency condition £"[y>| \j/ > 0] = E[y/]/(\ - p0). In
turn, this implies that the optimal regulatory landscape for the given investor type / has the
overall structure
The foregoing discussion has proved that the optimal regulatory landscape for a
particular investor type contains at most three distinct regions: a "safe harbor" (\y = 0), a
region of in which interdiction is certainly valid (y> = 1), and a region where the validity of
interdiction is uniformly maintained at the minimum level which supports interdiction by the
enforcement authority. Of these three regions, however, only the third is sure to have positive
probability mass, since it is only in this contingency that the appeals authority realizes
positive revenue. Because of the last observation, the optimal regulatory landscape F- in the
case of a single investor type can be distilled to the following simple form: If E[\f/] <q, then
F4 ~ 0 ~ P<i )5o + P<i5q; w h e r e a s > i f EM > g then F^ = pfy + (1 - p^ )5,. In both cases, the
appeals authority sets a single appeal fee cp = (p,(q); and the frequency pH of circumstances
which the optimal guidelines identify as offering minimal grounds for interdiction is
determined by rule of law y/ via the aggregate consistency condition £[i/>] = £[y/].
My main result may now be simply stated. The binary structure of regulatory
landscaping described above, which is optimal for a population consisting of a single investor
16
 This statement is equivalent to the proposition that for preferences conforming to
the expected utility model, a risk lover (weakly) prefers mean-preserving increases in risk.
- 1 8 -
type, is also optimal for any arbitrary collection of investors. This conclusion is fully
articulated in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. Let 7 be a finite population of investors, each with characteristics
(5,, v,, ut ) such that w, exhibits universally decreasing marginal utility of wealth, and let
y/v Q -> (0,1} be any objective rule of law. The appeals authority chooses consistent
guidelines of the form y/v Q -> [ 0,1 ] which honor the principles of full discovery and de
minimis, together with an schedule of contingent appeal fees q>: [0,1] -> 9*+. In this setting,
the appeals authority maximizes its own expected revenue from the equilibrium behavior of
investors and the enforcement authority by implementing a uniform appeal fee q>; and
guidelines y> which are of the form F^ = (1 - pq )<5Q + pq8q if E[y/] < q, or of the form
f\ = p^S + (1 - p^ )<5j if E[y] > q. In both cases, the frequency pq of circumstances
identified by the guidelines y/ as offering minimal grounds for interdiction is determined by
rule of law y/- via the aggregate consistency condition E[\j/] = E[\f/].
3.3. Discussion
My main result in Proposition 4 points to a simple, albeit ironic, logic governing the
construction of optimal regulatory guidelines, and thus the induced regulatory landscape of
publicly observable validity classes for interdiction. From the perspective of a revenue-
maximizing appeals authority, the optimal regulatory landscape is not completely
uninformative, but it is coarsely drawn. Subject to the requirement of consistency with an
exogenous rule of law, optimal regulatory guidelines aggregate the largest possible range of
circumstances over which the expected validity of interdiction is undifferentiated at the
lowest level which is still actionable for the enforcement authority. In this way, the appeals
authority promotes the highest possible rate of interdiction of private investment projects by
the enforcement authority under circumstances where such actions are nonetheless likely to
be voided on review by the appeals authority itself.
A striking feature of my analysis is that the optimal regulatory landscape described
above does not depend on the distribution of sunk costs, project returns, or risk attitudes
among investors, provided that investors have expected utility preferences with individually
constant absolute risk aversion. Moreover, the optimal regulatory landscape depends on the
underlying rule of law only to the extent the average validity rate of interdiction according to
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the latter is above or below the threshold validity rate which prompts intervention by the
enforcement authority. If the average validity rate of interdiction under the rule of law is less
than the enforcement authority's threshold validity rate, then completely uninformative
guidelines would produce a zero rate of interdiction by the enforcement authority, and hence
no custom for the appeals authority. In this situation, the optimal regulatory landscape
reveals a "safe harbor" of sufficient size to permit the classification of circumstances outside
the "safe harbor" as uniformly and minimally actionable for the enforcement authority.
Conversely, if the average validity rate of interdiction under the rule of law exceeds the
enforcement authority's threshold validity rate, then the optimal regulatory landscape refines
this information to the extent of identifying a region of circumstances where interdiction is
certainly valid. As before, this region is sufficiently large so that in all remaining
circumstances the enforcement authority interdicts with minimal confidence that these
interdictions will be upheld on subsequent appeal. In both cases, all contested interdictions
occur at the threshold validity rate, whence the design of an optimal contingent fee schedule
simplifies to a choice of an optimal uniform fee at the threshold validity rate.
The preceding discussion suggests a generalized interpretation of optimal regulatory
landscaping in situations where the appeals authority's freedom of interpretation is
circumscribed by superior legislation, treaties, or its own binding precedents.'' Publicly
known constraints which limit the appeals authority's freedom to interpret and construct the
prevailing rule of law in specific cases may be represented as super-guidelines y/, which are
identical in character to ordinary guidelines, but exogenous. The super-guidelines \p induce
a commonly observable partition of material facts. I will assume that this partition is finite,
so that the universe of material facts is categorized according to Q - Qx u . . . u Qm with
Qt n Qj = 0 for / * j , such that i/>(co) = qi for co e Qt.
17
 For example, countries belonging to the World Trade Organization or customs
unions such as the European Union must conform their regulatory practice regarding - among
others: product standards and safety certification, import tariffs and export subsidies, and
"voluntary export restraints" - to publically known standards of the host organization. The
situation is logically similar when the appeals authority follows its own historical precedents.
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Let us suppose that the appeals authority may refine the exogenous super-guidelines
\pr by issuing its own guidelines \j/, which are now subject to the consistency constraints
E[\pr Qt ] = qt for each Qt. It is apparent that each title Qt induced by the super-guidelines
constitutes a separate "green field" for further regulatory construction by the appeals authority
to which the logic of optimal regulatory landscaping from Proposition 4 applies directly.
4. Concluding Comments
4.1. Some Suggestive Examples
A regulatory system conforming to the Augustinian logic of my analysis should
exhibit active enforcement of sanctions by lower authorities which are waived relatively
frequently on appeal to higher authority. The appeal process provides an opportunity to
extract rents from the affected investor, whose willingness to undertake and pay for the
appeal depends on the perceived likelihood that the sanction will be rescinded. The following
anecdotal examples, drawn from emerging market economies, are consistent with this spirit:
• In August 1995, the government of India's Maharashtra state cancels an agreement with
Enron Corporation to build a large power generating plant, asserting that the project had
not been put out for competitive bids. After Enron renegotiates the cost of the project and
wins 24 separate lawsuits, construction is allowed to proceed in 1997. I8
• In March 1997, General Electric Corporation announces that it will close a subsidiary in
Russia because tax officials have sequestered its bank accounts in an effort to collect
taxes which General Electric claims to have already paid. In April of the same year, the
fire inspectorate in St. Petersburg, Russia threatens to shut down a Coca-Cola bottling
plant and halt construction on neighboring American firms for violation of fire codes.
Suspension of the judgment is offered in return for $1 million to build a new fire station.
A city official concedes that the Russian fire code is "almost impossible to follow".19
• As one of four highlighted elements of successful investment strategy in China, Business
Week advises foreign investors to "fly below the radar screen of Beijing's state planners,"
\ ft
"Investing in India," Business Week (11 August 1997). The Indian government
cites this episode as evidence that the rule of law in India supports foreign investment.
19
 "Laptops from Lapland," The Economist (6-12 September 1997).
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since, "Big, costly, and high-profile projects often get hopelessly snarled in red tape,
bureaucratic turf wars, and national politics".20
• Poland's administration of its VAT code has been criticized for ambiguity since its
inception in 1993. Penalties imposed by tax inspectors can be appealed to the Ministry of
Finance, and then through the Polish court system. Appeals may take several years. A
1996 white paper asserts that, "The lack of clarity in the VAT law and large number of
conflicting interpretations creates an environment in which it is very easy for the tax
authorities to accuse a taxpayer of non-compliance with VAT regulations and assess
penalties. In instances where the amounts are significant, hiring professional advisors and
attorneys to contest the claim may be successful but very costly in both fees and
opportunity cost of company personnel." *
4.2. Regulatory Transparency and Corruption
Corruption is generally interpreted among economists to mean the illicit buying or
selling of public property for private gain (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), or discernible fraud by
public functionaries in favor of privileged claimants (Cadot, 1987; Mui, 1995). However, the
popular understanding of corruption also encompasses the licit behavior of public agencies
possessing broad regulatory powers, who meddle in private undertakings in order to extract
rents for themselves. This broader interpretation of corruption "in the fabric" of a regulatory
system does not depend on the illegal activity of rogue agents, but rather on the entirely licit
behavior of functionaries who regulate in such a way as to promote claims which they
themselves will be called upon to resolve.
My characterization of the behavior of a self-interested appeals authority dovetails
roughly with the idea of corruption "in the fabric" of regulatory institutions. Moreover, an
atmosphere of regulatory ambiguity and unpredictability is also conducive to overt corruption
of the traditional sort. A regime in which sketchy regulatory guidelines are subject to various
interpretations lends itself to the pursuit of special arrangements and dispensations based on
connections and interest; a more transparent system, where the relation of circumstances to
consequences is clear, does not. In a climate of regulatory ambiguity, outcomes which are
20
 "Winn ing in China ," Business Week (26 M a y 1997).
21
 The Polish VAT System and its Influence on Business in Poland, American
Chamber of Commerce in Poland (March, 1996).
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actually based on favoritism or bribery can more easily be passed off as the result of objective
evaluation of particular circumstances in individual cases.
In this way, corruption "in the fabric" of a regulatory system is complementary which
the pursuit of private interests and agendas by the authority charged with its enforcement.
Under communism in Central and Eastern Europe, such practices were so pervasive that
people in these countries commonly express the belief that formal regulatory structures are
always and inevitably manipulable - what really matters are the interests of the people in
control.22 A particularly dark example of this phenomenon was the infamous Article 58 of
the Criminal Code of the former Soviet Union, which "summed up the world not so much
through the exact terms of its sections as in their extended dialectical interpretation"
(Solzhenitsyn, 1973, vol. 1). Under Article 58, any private conversation could be interpreted
as an attempt to begin a subversive organization, and failure to report a conversation overhead
among others as collaboration. In such situations, which may perhaps be regarded as the limit
of regulatory ambiguity, guilt or innocence depends on the will of the tribunal, since facts can
be read in various ways. A journalist in former Yugoslavia described press censorship under
communism in just such terms, "But I also understand that if he really needs to, he will find
evidence even if it doesn't exist. The guilt I'm talking about is not a question of facts but of
their interpretation" (Drakulic, 1987).
The comparison of corruption "in the fabric" based on limited regulatory transparency
and flexible interpretation with corruption based on demonstrably illegal transactions leads to
a provocative conclusion, which may be phrased in the language of mechanism design.
Pushed to its limits, licit corruption "in the fabric" is technologically superior from the point
of view of its practitioners to corruption of the traditional sort which requires the performance
of illegal acts. Who needs to risk breaking the law, if the law itself is sufficiently flexible to
produce desired outcomes?
" This observation reflects my personal experience in formerly communist countries
of Central and Eastern Europe.
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Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1-4 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. The class of utility indices u(z) for which p = -u"{z)/ u\z) > 0 is
constant consists of those which satisfy the linear differential equation
u'(z) = k-pu(z) (Al)
for some scalar k.
It is obvious that the expected utility functional U(z) = E[u(z)] exhibits universally
decreasing marginal utility of wealth if (Al) holds.
To prove the converse of the proposition, let u{z) be a strictly increasing utility index
that does not satisfy (Al). This implies that there exist certain wealth levels z, < z2 < z3 such
that i}u(z]) + (l-^)u(z3)^u(z2) for some fle(O,l),but #K ' (Z , ) + ( 1 -# )« ' ( z 3 )* u'(z2).
Let x and y be risks whose outcomes are distributed as F- - $8, + (1 - &)87 and
F- = ST^. From the preceding construction, it follows immediately that E[u(x)] = E[u(y)]
while simultaneously E[u'{x)] * E[u'(y)]. Hence, the expected utility functional
U (z) = E[ u( z) ] does not exhibit universally decreasing marginal utility of wealth. |
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that a type-/ investor with characteristics (s,, v,, ut) faces
the regulatory landscape F^ = po8o + p{8q^ +... + Pn8qn. I wish to characterize the optimal
contingent fee schedule {(pt (qt): i = 1 n) under the specification (3)-(5), which
corresponds to the decision tree in Figure 2. To do this, it will be necessary to distinguish
two mutually exclusive cases.
The first case arises if the investor can profitably undertake the investment on the
basis of the "safe harbor" alone: that is, if investment followed by a decision to abandon the
project in the event of interdiction yields positive utility. This situation results if
/?ow,(v,-j ,) + ( l - p o ) w , ( - s , ) > O , (A2)
from which the investor's willingness to pay for an appeal is bounded by the potential
disutility ut(-s,) of abandoning an interdicted project. In this case, the value of the
contingent appeal fee (pt(qt) for the regulatory sub-landscape po8Q +(1 - po)8qi is strictly
positive for all / = 1,.... n, and is determined by
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tf,(«i.fr(*i)) = «,(-•*,)• (A3)
I next turn my attention to optimal contingent fees arising from the specification (3)-(5).
Whenever inequality (A2) holds, then constraint (5) is necessarily slack, and hence <p,(g,) is
also determined by (A3). Therefore, in this case, (pt {qi) = <pt {qt) for / = 1,..., n.
The second case arises if investment followed by abandoning the project in the event
of interdiction yields strictly negative utility, that is
p0ut{vt-st) + {\-p0)ut{-st)<0. (A4)
Now, the contingent appeal fee (pt(q,) for the regulatory sub-landscape pQ8Q + (1 - po)Sq is
given by
pou[(vl-s[) + (\-Po)Ut(qi,vl(qi)) = O. (A5)
It remains to show that the optimal contingent fee schedule {(pt(qi):i = \,...,n} for
the specification (3)-{5) also obeys (A5). The Lagrangian for this specification is
(A6)
where v(, / = 1 n, and A are multipliers corresponding to the constraints (4) and (5).
Since these constraints impose lower bounds on either the investor's contingent or aggregate
utility, each multiplier will be strictly positive whenever its associated constraint binds.
When inequality (A4) holds, then the aggregate utility constraint (5) necessarily binds,
and it must also be true that U
 t{ql,(pl{ql))> ut{~st) for at least one index value i = \,...,n.
Suppose for the moment that there also exists another index value j=l,...,n, j *i such that
^,(<?y.<P/(9;)) = " f ( - ^ ) - In such a situation, we would have Ul(qi,<pt(qi))>Ut(qj,<pl(qj))
while simultaneously
d<p, d<Pj
in consequence of the optimality condition for the Lagrangian given above. But this state of
affairs contradicts the assumption that the utility function Ut exhibits universally decreasing
marginal utility of wealth.
The preceding discussion has proved that when inequality (A4) holds , then
Ut(qi>(Pl(<ll))>ut(~st) for a ^ i = l,....n. The optimality condition for the Lagrangian (A6)
therefore implies that
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dcp} ' dcpn
so that
follows from universally decreasing marginal utility of wealth. Substituting the final series of
equalities into the constraint (5) yields pQut(v[-s[) + Ut(qi,<pt(ql)) = O for all i-\,...,n,
which replicates (A5). Thus, in this case also, q>t{qt) = >^,(<7() for / = \,...,n. |
Remarks. Under the optimal contingent fee schedule {(pt (qt): i = 1,..., n} for the type-r
investor and regulatory landscape as given, the investor's net utility from undertaking the
investment must be nonnegative whenever constraint (5) binds. In itself, this does not imply
that the investor must realize nonnegative expected utility in all sub-lotteries of the form
po8Q + (1 - po)Sqi corresponding to branches in the decision tree shown in Figure 3.
However, the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of wealth implies sufficient regularity
in the investor's willingness to pay for appeal in different contingencies, that the optimal fee
schedule cpt indeed equalizes the investor's utility in every contingency for the validity rate
qt, whence (pc = <p,.
Without the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of wealth, not only does this
equality fail, but also the new optimal contingent fee schedule (p,(q) cannot be specified
independently of the regulatory landscape F^>0 outside the "safe harbor". In this situation,
the problem of optimal regulatory landscaping given by (9)—<10) in the main text becomes
much more complicated, and no longer conforms to the canonical structure of choosing a
mean-constrained distribution to maximize the expectation of a given convex function.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is obvious that <pr(l) = 0 , since the investor receives no possible
benefit from an appeal in circumstances where interdiction is certainly valid. I turn now to
the remaining points of the proposition.
Faced with the regulatory sub-landscape po8Q + (1 - po)8q, the type-r investor's utility
from undertaking the investment and appealing an eventual interdiction with expected
validity rate q and fee <p,(q) is given by
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pout(vt - s,) + (\- po)[{\-q)ut(vt - s, -(p{
As in the proof of Proposition 2, it is necessary to distinguish two mutually exclusive
cases. The first case arises if inequality (A2) holds, meaning that the investor can profitably
undertake the investment on the basis of the "safe harbor" alone. In this case, ipt{q) is strictly
positive everywhere on [0,1 ] and is given by
(\-q)ut(vt-st -<p,(<?)) + <7M,(-s, - cpr(q)) = u,(-s). (A7)
The second case applies if inequality (A4) holds, whence investment followed by
abandoning the project in the event of interdiction yields strictly negative utility. In this case,
the threshold appeal fee cpt(q) is necessarily lower than in the previous case, and must be
zero for validity rates q that are sufficiently close to 1. Whenever (pt(q) > 0, then (pt(q) is
determined by equating to zero the investor's utility from undertaking the investment and
appealing an eventual interdiction. This gives
Po
- q)ut(vt - st - <pt{q)) + qut{-st -q>t{q)) = - ut(vt-st). (A8)
Notice that the left-hand sides of equalities (A7) and (A8) are identical, whereas the
right-hand sides are constants. Thus, in both cases, we have
<0
whenever (pt(q) > 0 . This establishes that q>,(q) is strictly decreasing whenever it is positive
on [0.1].
Differentiating a second time shows that (p,(q) is convex if and only if
_
 2 u't(v, -s,-(p,(q)) - u;(-st - <p,(q)) > _ (1 - q)u?(v, - st - <p,(q)) + qu?(-s, - <p,(q))
ul(vt - s, - (p,(q))- ut{-s, - (p,(q)) ~ {\-q)u,{vl - s, - (pt(q)) + qut{~st - <p, '
It is easy to verify that this inequality is satisfied for any investor whose Arrow-Pratt index of
risk aversion p, = -M"(Z) / M,'(Z) > 0 is constant. |
Proof of Proposition 4. The maximum incentive-compatible contingent appeal fee which
apples to an arbitrary subset of investors A c T is defined by
(pA(q) = min(p,(q),
teA
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which is simply the minimum over threshold appeal fees for investors in the subset.
According to Proposition 3, (pA is strictly decreasing on the interval [0,1] whenever it is
greater than zero, and satisfies the right endpoint condition (pA(\) = 0. Although <pA is not
necessarily convex on the interval [0,1 ] , this function does exhibit a weaker convexity-
related property which is sufficient for the purposes of this proof.
I will say that a function / : 9 \ -> 9* with domain D is convex to a point x0 e D if for
all yeD, / ( t fv + (l - &)x0 )<# / (>• ) + ( l - t f ) / ( * 0 ) for all tfe(0,l). The property of
convexity to a point is weaker than general convexity: A convex function is necessarily
convex to every point in its domain; however, a function which is not convex in general may
nonetheless be convex to a specific point in its domain. For the individual contingent fee
functions <p, and cp2 in Figure 4, the joint contingent fee function for both investor types
(pu ,j = min {<p, ,cp2} is not convex on [0,1], but it is convex to the point q = 1.
Lemma 1, which is stated and proved below, shows that this example can be
generalized. As a consequence of this lemma, for any investor subgroup A c T, the
threshold fee function cpA(q) defined on [0,1] is convex to the point q - 1
To complete the proof, first observe that the optimal regulatory landscape may
decomposed into a "safe harbor" and regions which support interdiction via
F* =M)+a-Po)>W>o, (A9)
where F^^ has support on [q, 1 ] in keeping with the de minimis condition. For any
interdiction validity rate q e [q,\ ], the maximal contingent payoff to the appeals authority is
realized by evaluating every investor subgroup according to its threshold appeal fee and share
in the population. More specifically, focusing on any given subgroup of investors A c T, the
appeals authority can realize a contingent payoff equal to P(A)cpA{q) by setting a contingent
appeal fee of (pA(q) at interdiction validity rate q e [q, 1 ]. Maximizing over all investor
subgroups, the optimal contingent payoff function n{q) to the appeals authority is given by
7t(q)= max P(A)(pA{q)
{ A C T }
for interdiction validity rates qe[q,\]. In common with its progenitors of the form (pA(q),
7t(q) is strictly decreasing on [q,\] whenever it is greater than zero, and satisfies ;r(l) = 0 .
An application of Lemma 1 establishes that n(q) is convex to the point q = 1.
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FIGURE 4
THE OPTIMAL CONTINGENT PAYOFF FUNCTION n{q)
0.0 0.5 1.0
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal contingent payoff function n{q) for a population of
two investor types. In this example, type-1 investors are risk averse and have a higher project
realization value than type-2 investors, who are risk neutral. Population frequencies of both
investor types are P( 1) = .6 and P( 2) = .4.
The remainder of the proof proceeds similarly to the discussion in the main text for
the case of a single investor type. Given the optimal "safe harbor" frequency pQ from (A9),
the appeals authority chooses F^^ to maximize
\Xqn{q)dF-^{q) (A10)
subject to the aggregate consistency condition
E[y>\y>0)=E[ys)/(\-p0). (All)
Since the optimal contingent payoff function n(q) is convex to the point q = 1, the
optimal regulatory landscape F^^ outside the "safe harbor" exhibits maximal dispersion
over the interval [q,\]. Hence, F^ has the form
Fi=Po5O + P<t5q + PA> (A 1 2)
where both pq and px are determined from the regulatory consistency condition (All) once
the "safe harbor" frequency p0 is known.
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Since the appeals authority receives a nonzero revenue flow only when the
interdiction validity rate in (A 12) is q, the optimal regulatory landscape assumes one of two
elementary forms, each with binary support: If E[y] < q then F^ - (1 - pq)5Q + pq8q; while
if E[y/] > q then F^ = pH8q + (1 - pq )£j. In both cases, the appeals authority sets a uniform
appeal fee (p = <pA. (q), where A* is any subgroup of investors which realizes the contingent
payoff iz{q) at the threshold validity rate q. The frequency p of circumstances identified
by the guidelines \j/ as offering minimal grounds for interdiction is determined by rule of law
\y via the aggregate consistency condition E[\j/] = E[y/). |
LEMMA 1. (CONVEXITY TO A POINT) For an arbitrary index set /, let {/, :iel} be a group of
real-valued functions of one real variable defined on common domain D, such that for every
i € / , / , is nonincreasing, convex to the point xoe D, and satisfies / , (x0) = c for some
constant c. Then, the functions min {/,: i e /} and max {/•; i e /} are also nonincreasing and
convex to the point x0.
Proof. For every ; ' e / , fj(a)>fj(b) for any a,bsD such that b>a. It follows that
f j ( a ) > m i n [ f ^ b ) : i e l ) , a n d h e n c e t h a t m i n {ft(a): i e I } > m i n [fi(b): i s I } .
Likewise, for every j e I, aeD, and # e [0,1],
This implies
and hence
Proofs of the corresponding propositions for max {/,: ie I) are exactly analogous,
and are therefore omitted. |
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